The UK Supreme Court has made a ruling on the scope of the common law duty of care owed by police officers to the public in the case of Robinson v Chief Constable of the West Yorkshire Police. It was found that the police had a duty of care to avoid causing injury to a member of the public where their activities resulted in danger as consequence of their own conduct.
The central focus of the case concerned an elderly lady, Ms. Robinson who was knocked over by the police during an attempted arrest of a drug dealer in July 2008. Ms Robinson suffered injuries as a result and she issued proceedings for personal injury damages against the arresting officers involved on the basis of negligence.
The proceedings were brought before a Recorder who used CCTV footage along with witness testimony. The Recorder concluded that the decision of the police to arrest the suspect at that time and place involved a foreseeable risk that Ms Robinson would be injured. At the time of the attempted arrest, Ms Robinson was in very close proximity to the suspect, the risk was exacerbated somewhat by her age and relative frailty. The Recorder found that the officers had indeed acted negligently, however the decision in Hill v Chief Constable of West Yorkshire [1989] had conferred and immunity against claims of negligence on the police.
The Applicant Ms Robinson then brought the case to the Court of Appeal. Hallett LJ of the Court of Appeal applied the “Caparo test” from Caparo Industries plc v Dickman [1990]. Hallett LJ Noted that most claims against police in negligence for their acts and omission fail the Carparo test, i.e. It would not be fair, just and reasonable to impose a duty, as the interests of the public would not be best served by imposing that duty onto police officers. Although Hallett LJ accepted that there might be cases of outrageous negligence where police officers may be responsible for the injuries of a claimant, Ms Robinson’s case did not fall into that category. Furthermore, Hallett LJ felt that is was not the police officers who caused the injuries, but rather the suspect being apprehended. There was no proximity between Ms Robinson and the officers, and it was not enough to find that there was a reasonably foreseeable risk of her being physically injured in the course of carrying out the arrest. The other two Justices present were in agreement with Hallett LJ and Ms Robinsons appeal was rejected. She then took the case before the Supreme Court
The Supreme Court was asked to consider 6 Questions: (1) Does the existence of a duty of care always depend on the application of “the Caparo test” to the facts of the particular case? (2) Is there a general rule that the police are not under any duty of care when discharging their function of investigating and preventing crime? Or are the police generally under a duty of care to avoid causing reasonably foreseeable personal injuries, when such a duty would arise in accordance with ordinary principles of the law of negligence? If the latter is the position, does the law distinguish between acts and omissions: in particular, between causing injury, and protecting individuals from injury caused by the conduct of others? (3) If the latter is the position, is this an omissions case, or a case of a positive act? (4) Did the police officers owe a duty of care to Mrs Robinson? (5) If so, was the Court of Appeal entitled to overturn the Recorder’s finding that the officers failed in that duty? (6) If there was a breach of a duty of care owed to Mrs Robinson, were her injuries caused by that breach?
The Supreme Court allowed the appeal and concluded that a duty of care existed between the officers involved and Ms Robinson. In his judgement, Lord Reed stated that where the police take actions that potentially create a reasonably foreseeable danger to a member of the public they owe a duty of care; “They may have a duty of care to protect an individual from a danger of injury which they themselves have created”. Though he added that he police are not usually not under a duty of care to protect individuals from a danger of injury which they have not created. Lord Hughes, while agreeing that the appeal should be upheld, took a difference approach. He stated that often policing can involve unavoidable risks to individuals and involves a very delicate balancing of choices. These decisions are often made under pressure and the question in cases like that of Ms Robinsons is not whether the decision was wrong, but whether it was reasonable in light of the circumstances.
Click here to read the full judgement.
Click here for further commentary on the case.