In a unanimous decision the Chamber judgement found that the Russian authorities had placed such severe limitations on the applicants planned protests that it amounted to a violation of their right to freedom of assembly. The Chamber judgement focused on the degree to which authorities can impose restrictions on time, place and manner of individual protests and their ability to place blanket bans on demonstrations in precise locations. It was found that these restrictions – along with a wide range of other measures taken against the applicants – had been disproportionate and unjustified. Furthermore, the Chamber found the restrictions were based on legal provisions which had not protected against an arbitrary and discriminatory use of the authorities powers and no legal procedure existed which allowed the applicants to challenge the authorities decisions.
By way of background the applicants (23 Russian nationals) planned a number of protests in the years 2009-2012 across a range of issues; including LGBT rights, police reform, human rights abuses and the fight against corruption. Formal notices were submitted to the appropriate local authority notifying it of their intention to hold an event. The Russian Public Events Act states that applicants cannot proceed with a public event if the authorities have made a “well-reasoned proposal” to change its time or location. In many instances the authorities refused to approve the location, time or manner of conduct and in others proposed locations that was out of the sight and sound of target audiences i.e. remote locations outside of urban areas.
The applicants argued that the Russian Public Events Act was contrary to multiple international mechanisms that have stated that freedom of assembly necessitates a right to protest “within sight and sound” of the target audience. The applicants complained that the Act gave executive authorities excessive discretion relating to the control of protests and their location and that there was no effective judicial control on their proposals.
The Chamber judgement noted that the interference with the right to freedom of assembly need not necessarily involve an outright ban of an event, but can occur through other restrictions i.e. the time, manner and venue. The Court found the interference was based on legal provisions which did not meet the Convention’s ‘quality of law’ requirements and the interference had not been necessary in a democratic society. Further, it was found that the authorities had not given sufficient reasons for their amended proposals and were based on legal provisions which did not provide for adequate and effective legal safeguards against arbitrary and excessive exercise of the wide discretion left to the executive.
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