In Lynch v. Minister for Justice, Judge Murray in the Supreme Court ruled that the mandatory life sentence for murder was not unconstitutional or incompatible with the European Convention on Human Rights. This is a case from 2010, but the judgment has only recently been published on the courts website.
The appellant parties submitted that the imposition of the mandatory life sentence offended the constitutional doctrine or principle of proportionality since the trial judge had no discretion to impose or tailor a sentence which reflected the particular circumstances in which the offence may have been committed. The state in response argued that the principle of the separation of powers requires the Oireachtas to determine the penalties which may be imposed by the court for specified offences. The imposition of the mandatory life sentence is within the legislative powers of the Oireachtas as it is entitled to take the view that there is no murder that warrants less than a punitive life sentence. Therefore, the fact that a court is not left with discretion in the matter cannot be said to amount to an intrusion by the Oireachtas.
Judge Murray stated that “since the foundation of the State the crime of murder has been considered to be one of exceptional gravity in the criminal calendar”. He stated that the approach of the appellant in seeking to draw parallels between murder and other crimes which involve unlawful killing was unfounded and misconceived. Although Judge Murray accepted that murders occur in a myriad of circumstances with different degrees of moral blameworthiness, the crime itself remains at the highest level of gravity. In relation to incompatibility with the ECHR, the court held that the case law relied upon by the appellants had no material application to their case and that the European Court of Human Rights “continues to recognise that a mandatory life sentence as a punitive measure for a serious crime imposed in accordance with national law does not as such offend against any provision of the Convention provided at least that national law affords the possibility of review with a view to its commutation or conditional release”. The court therefore dismissed on this ground also.
Click here to read the judgment.