Northern Ireland: High Court judge refuses developers summary judgment for specific performance to compel defendant to purchase apartment he can no longer afford

Please click here to see last week's decision of the High Court in Northern Ireland, Titanic Quarter Limited -v- Neil Rowe [2010] NICH 14.

The Plaintiff had put down a deposit on an apartment in Belfast but after losing his job and being forced to sell his home, could no longer afford to pay the apartment asking price.The developers, Titanic Quarter Ltd, sought summary judgment for specific performance to compel the Plaintiff to complete the purchase. Deeny J refused to make such an order, finding that a Court should not make an order "that will beat upon the air". The Plaintiff remains in breach of contract, and the developer will retain the deposit. The matter will proceed to full hearing and damages may be payable.

Deeny J recognised that it was to a degree a test case but indicated that such cases may turn on the individual facts.

Please click here to see a recent case in the Irish High Court on a similar issue.Clarke J ruled that three couples who had agreed to purchase investment apartments in City West at the height of the market in 2006 did not have to complete the contracts. The ruling discussed the spectrum of circumstances in which a Court will refuse to grant an order of specific performance, with the circumstances here being one of impossibility rather than hardship.

Similar to the ruling in Titanic Quarter Limited -v- Neil Rowe [2010] NICH 14, in refusing to grant specific performance, Clarke J outlined that "the only point in the court ordering specific performance is if there is some realistic possibility that the sale may complete. If there is no such realistic possibility, then the making of an order for specific performance will be in vain... if it is obvious that there is no realistic possibility of the sale closing, a court should not, in the absence of highly unusual circumstances, order specific performance for in so doing nothing would be achieved. The ordering of specific performance will simply lead to a further hearing at which the order will be discharged and damages in lieu directed. Such would be a pointless exercise."

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