On the 19 April 2024, Mr Justice Simons in the High Court directed that there should be a modular trial held in McGovern v. Governor of Limerick Prison & Ors, as the case was prima facie out of time and it would be unsatisfactory for a defendant to spend a significant amount of time and money in a trial where they seem to have a complete defence and the case could ultimately be statute –barred. The proceedings were initiated by the plaintiff to seek recourse for her experience in Limerick prison, whereby the events occurred 16 years before the proceedings were instituted. This judgement concerned whether the issue of delay should be heard and decided upon individually before the court carries on with a substantive hearing of the proceedings to follow.
The background of the plaintiff’s case was founded upon two main complaints arising from her past incarceration in Limerick prison. The first complaint related to the plaintiff’s alleged subjection to a ‘slopping out’ regime, which was a previous practice of prisoners using chamber pots at night and emptying the contents the following morning. Additionally, it was also submitted that the plaintiff did not receive adequate medical care, treatment or supervision during her time in the prison, for her mental health and depression.
In response to the allegations, the defendants claimed that the case was inadmissible due to delay, relying particularly on the Statute of Limitations 1957, the Statute of Limitations (Amendment) Act 1991 and the European Convention of Human Rights to show that it was statute-barred. They further submitted that should their claim of delay be well-founded, it would result in the proceedings being dispositive, with such a determination on delay potentially saving significant time and costs. The defendants proposed two means to the court for dealing with the claim about delay. The first proposal was for a trial of a preliminary issue pursuant to Order 25 of the Rules of the Superior Courts, and the second was for a modular trial pursuant to courts inherent jurisdiction and/or the amended Order 36 Rule 9 (1). The court held that the application was more properly brought through a modular trial, as the material facts of the case were in dispute, as for a trial of a preliminary issue, there must be agreement for the material facts.
The court noted that, similarly to a trial for a preliminary issue, where the decision would not likely save on time or costs, it would not generally direct a modular trial in this scenario. However, it stated that it is not precluded from making a finding for a modular trial where there is a factual dispute, as this would be inconsistent with the wording of Order 36 Rule 9 (1), and collapse the distinction between the two. In this discussion that ensued, the court considered its jurisdiction as per McCann v. Desmond [2010] IEHC 164, and Cork Plastics (Manufacturing) v. Ineos Compound U.K. Ltd [2008] IEHC 93.
In response to the defendants delay defence, the plaintiff claimed that she was of unsound mind, and this statutory ‘disability’ would qualify her for an extension of the limitation period under section 49 of the Statute of Limitations. Contesting this point, the defendant pointed to the proceedings instituted by the plaintiff in 2006 for personal injury, in relation to an alleged assault while in prison, claiming that this proved she was capable of instructing solicitors at that time.
While considering this, the Court went on to discuss how the modular trial would hypothetically be conducted, noting that it would focus on the state of mind of the plaintiff during the limitation period. Mr Justice Simons suggested that trial would only take one or two days to be heard and would be of narrow content, with the nature and extent of the documentary evidence being “relatively modest.” He contrasted this to the length and extensiveness of a substantive hearing, and found that a modular hearing would potentially save on time and costs, as should the defendants succeed in the delay point, proceedings would be completed in this short time. The judge rejected claims this would cause the plaintiff prejudice, either through causing her, as a highly vulnerable person, to have to give evidence twice or through the duplication of costs. The court also considered the issue of efficiency in relation to the number of appeals that the plaintiff could take but the judge held that these risks of inefficiencies were overstated.
In concluding his findings, Mr Justice Simons held that:
“It would be unsatisfactory if a defendant who, on the face of it, appears to have a complete defence to the proceedings by reference to the expiration of a statutory time-limit... —was nonetheless put to the time and expense of preparing for and participating in a full trial of the action in circumstances where the proceedings might ultimately be found to be statute-barred.”
To read the judgement of Mr Justice Simons in McGovern v. Governor of Limerick Prison & Ors [2024] IEHC 210, click here.